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Abstract—The growing threat of personal data breach in data
trading pinpoints an urgent need to develop countermeasures for
preserving individual privacy. The state-of-the-art work either
endows the data collector with the responsibility of data privacy
or reports only a privacy-preserving version of the data. The
basic assumption of the former approach that the data collector
is trustworthy does not always hold true in reality, whereas
the latter approach reduces the value of data. In this paper,
we investigate the privacy leakage issue from the root source.
Specifically, we take a fresh look to reverse the inferior position
of the data provider by making her dominate the game with
the collector to solve the dilemma in data trading. To that
aim, we propose the noisy-sequentially zero-determinant (NSZD)
strategies by tailoring the classical zero-determinant strategies,
originally designed for the simultaneous-move game, to adapt
to the noisy sequential game. NSZD strategies can empower the
data provider to unilaterally set the expected payoff of the data
collector or enforce a positive relationship between her and the
data collector’s expected payoffs. Both strategies can stimulate
a rational data collector to behave honestly, boosting a healthy
data trading market. Numerical simulations are used to examine
the impacts of key parameters and the feasible region where the
data provider can be an NSZD player. Finally, we prove that the
data collector cannot employ NSZD to further dominate the data
market for deteriorating privacy leakage.
Index Terms—Data trading, privacy leakage, the zero-
determinant strategies, the noisy sequential game
I. INTRODUCTION
We are nowhere to hide in the big-data era. From a
simple click on a browser, to provide data in exchange for
personalized services, all of these are exposing our habits
and dispositions. In a nutshell, personal data has high added
values to change the way the society thinks, lives and works,
leading to a personal data gold rush, where service providers,
advertisers, and even governments are all casting a wide net to
collect personal data feverishly. This will make personal data
as a tradable asset [?]. However, the personal data market is
being hampered due to serious privacy issues. For example,
in April 2018, a Norwegian non-profit organization called
SINTEF reported the gay hookup app Grindr, which has more
than 3.6 million daily active users, has been providing its
users’ HIV status to two other companies [1]; In October
2017, it was discovered that Alteryx exploded data records
for approximately 123 million U.S. households, with each
record including 248 different data fields, making it simple
to determine to whom the data was linked, either by looking
at the details or by crosschecking with previous leaks [2].
The growing threat of personal data breach pinpoints a
need to develop countermeasures in order to protect individual
privacy. Based on who bears the responsibility of protecting
data privacy, the state-of-the-art privacy preservation work
can be classified into two approaches: the data collector-
based and the data provider-based. The former [3]–[7] was the
mainstream approach which endows the data collector with the
responsibility of data privacy so that data can be protected well
or the privacy leakage will be limited to a certain level; more
recent studies, such as [8], belong to the latter approach, which
assumes that the data collector is not trustworthy and the data
provider should report only a privacy-preserving version of the
data to take full control of her1 own data privacy.
In fact, the data provider has hitherto been at an unfair
disadvantage in data trading due to the following reasons:
1) different from typical commodities, personal data is free
commons in nature [9], implying that it is convenient to copy
and transfer, which causes personal data easy to leak. Further,
the more powerful the digital technologies are, the cheaper
and faster the processing of sensitive data become, giving rise
to more serious privacy concerns; 2) information is inherently
asymmetric in data trading. On one hand, it is hard for the data
provider to know whether and to whom the data collector will
resell data; on the other hand, the data collector can also mask
some information to conceal his identity for avoiding being
detected. As a result, data providers often lack information to
make privacy-sensitive decisions as empirical and theoretical
research suggested [10].
The above disadvantage may make the data collector un-
1In this paper, we denote the data provider as she and the collector as he
for easy differentiation.
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reliable. Further, the second approach, with the main idea
of being to submit privacy-preserving data by its owner,
may leave dire straits to both data collectors and providers.
This is because noisy, pseudonymous, or anonymous data is
clearly less valuable than the authentic data, and thus the data
provider-based approach for privacy preservation likely would
cut down economic and social benefits from big data analysis,
such as personalizing services, optimizing decision making
and predicting future trends. In short, it is challenging to find
a silver bullet to achieve a win-win situation where the data
provider reports true data and the collector is honest enough
to protect privacy.
In this paper, we tackle the above challenge from a fresh
angle, aiming to address the privacy leakage issue from the
root source. Specifically, we study the interaction between
the data provider and the data collector where both sides are
allowed to take preventive measures against each other. Since
the dilemma in data trading stems from the disadvantage of
the data provider, a natural idea is to change her inferior
position by making the data provider dominate the game with
the collector. To that aim, we resort to the zero-determinant
(ZD) strategies [11], whose adopter (i.e., the ZD player) can
unilaterally set the expected utility of its opponent or the ratio
of their expected utilities, no matter what actions the opponent
takes. The power of the ZD strategies offers the data provider
the opportunities to control the expected payoff of the data
collector, based on which incentive mechanisms can be applied
for stimulating a rational data collector, who is utility-driven,
to behave cooperatively. The main contributions of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• We propose the noisy-sequentially zero-determinant
(NSZD) strategies by tailoring the classical ZD strategies,
originally designed for the simultaneous-move game, to
adapt to the noisy sequential game, which is employed
to model the data trading under consideration.
• The conditions that the data provider can adopt the
pinning NSZD strategy are analyzed, through which the
data provider is able to unilaterally set the expected
payoff of the data collector. We further study the impacts
of the data provider’s strategy and the noises added by
both players on the expected payoff of the data collector.
Moreover, numerical simulation is used to illustrate the
feasible region under which the data provider can be a
pinning NSZD player, which makes room for incentive
mechanisms to stimulate the cooperation of the data
collector.
• We study the conditions that the data provider can be
an extortionate NSZD adopter so as to enforce a positive
relationship between her and the data collector’s expected
payoffs. This will facilitate the cooperation of both play-
ers, because their expected payoffs can be maximized in
this case, thus boosting a healthy data trading market.
• We prove that the data collector cannot be an NSZD
player to employ the pinning or extortionate strategies. In
other words, this finding reveals that the data collector,
who already has an advantage, cannot take advantage of
NSZD, to further dominate the data market for deterio-
rating privacy leakage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the related work in Section II. The game formulation for data
trading is presented in Section III. Section IV proposes the
NSZD strategies. The analysis of the data provider being a
pinning NSZD and an extortionate NSZD player are presented
in detail respectively, in Sections V and VI. Section VII
analyzes the possibility whether the data collector can employ
NSZD. The whole paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Based on the role of data protection, the state-of-the-art
privacy preservation work can be classified into two categories:
the data collector-based and the data provider-based.
Most existing studies belong to the first category of ap-
proaches, where it is the data collector who takes full respon-
sibility of data privacy so that data can be protected well or
the privacy leakage will be limited to a certain level [3]–[7].
For example, Haiming Jin et al. [3] proposed an incentive
mechanism for the data collector to gather personal data, which
takes advantage of data aggregation and perturbation to meet
the satisfaction of data accuracy and privacy protection, re-
spectively. In [4], a data collector buys data from multiple data
providers and employs anonymization techniques to protect
their privacy. In this scenario, a contract theoretic approach
was proposed for the data collector to balance the trade-off
between privacy protection and data utility.
[5] protects the privacy of both data and cost through
designing a Bayesian incentive compatible and privacy-
preserving mechanism. Arpita Ghosh et al. [6] designed a
differentially private peer-prediction mechanism to collect data
from privacy-sensitive population considering their statistic of
the preference for privacy, which can guarantee -differential
privacy to each data provider against the adversary who is able
to observe the statistical estimate. In [7], some mechanisms
are for the data collector, which are individually rational for
data providers with monotonic privacy valuations, truthful
for those whose privacy valuations are not too large, and
accurate if there are not too many data providers with too-
large privacy valuations. The common traits of [5]–[7] lie in
that the data collector dominates the game between it and the
data provider through designing a mechanism, namely a game
rule, to preserve data privacy or compensate the data providers
for their loss in privacy.
Considering that the data provider has no control of data
privacy after transferring private data to the data collector,
Weina Wang et al. [8] proposed the second category of
approach, in which the data collector is assumed to be not
trustworthy and hence the data provider takes full control of
its own data privacy. In detail, a data provider reports only
a privacy-preserving version of its data. In this scenario, [8]
employs a game-theoretic model to derive the fundamental
limits on the value of privacy, based on which the lower and
upper bounds on the minimum total payment for the data
collector are deduced to guarantee a given data accuracy.
Different from the above work, some researchers focus on
the data privacy preservation methods, rather than who will
adopt them. These methods can be classified into three kinds:
the noise-based, the anonymity-based and the cryptography-
based. In the noise-based methods, randomization techniques
are employed to add noises to the original data for mask-
ing some attributes of records while keeping the structures
unchanged for future analysis [12], [13]. In the anonymity-
based method, data generalization is employed to hide the link
between records and data owners [14], [15]. k-anonymity and
l-diversity are the two well-known anonymity-based methods.
As the key technology of data security, cryptography-based
methods convert plain texts into cipher ones through encryp-
tion keys or algorithms to prevent an illegal user from getting
useful information [16], [17].
III. GAME FORMULATION FOR DATA TRADING
Personal data can optimize decision making and promote
economic growth. It is a valuable asset in the market, where
the data collector purchases informative data from the data
provider, which can be an individual or a data broker who
aggregates information from a variety of sources. Since data
is free commons in nature and there is often asymmetric
information in data trading, data breach becomes serious. In
this scenario, the data provider should decide to submit either a
fully identifiable data or its privacy-preserving version such as
noise-injected data, which is a dilemma due to following trade-
off: the unprocessed data is more valuable but jeopardizes the
owner’s privacy; the data collector should determine whether
to resell the provider’s personal data to third parties: the sale
of such data may gain more profit for the data collector but
would do harm to his reputation when detected, which may
reduce his future chances of data trading.
Thus motivated, we cast the above problem in a game-
theoretic setting, where the data trading game between the data
provider and the collector is a sequential one in that the data
provider moves first (i.e., submitting the data) and the collector
makes his decision later (i.e., whether resells the data). As
illustrated in Fig. 1, both players, namely the data provider
and the collector, can take one of two actions: the cooperation
C or the defection D. In detail, the data provider takes action
C if she reports original data or D if provides data with noise
injection. Similarly, the data collector is cooperative (C) when
he protects data privacy or detective (D) if it resells the data to
third parties. In this paper, we assume that the data collector is
intelligent to conceal his identity, i.e., adding some noises to
the data for interfering the data provider’s judgement, before
leaking private data. Thus, the state vector of the data trading
game is [xy]4, where x ∈ {C,D} and y ∈ {C,D} respectively
denote the actions of the data provider and the collector.
Table I summarizes the payoff matrix under the above
four states, where the data provider is denoted as X and
the collector is indicated as Y. In this payoff matrix, τ1, τ2,
σ1 and σ2 are all scale parameters. e1 and e2 are noises
Submit original data(C)
Submit data with noise(D)
Data Provider Data Collector Third Party
No leakage(C)
Leak data with noise(D)
Fig. 1. Data trading game between the data provider and the data collector.
respectively added by the data provider and the collector
which are normalized within [0, 1]. Since e1 is employed to
preserve data privacy, the value of the data is proportional to
1− e1. Moreover, because e2 is adopted to mask the identity
of the data collector, 1 − e2 reflects the probability that the
malicious behavior of the data collector can be detected. Other
parameters in the payoff matrix are outlined as follows: 1) CP
and CC are respectively the profits of the data provider and
the collector obtained from the data trading when two players
are cooperative and thus their profits will reduce to (1−e1)CP
and (1 − e1)CC respectively if the data provider defects; 2)
the data collector can obtain an extra profit CC1 from leaking
the data provider’s information while the data provider would
have a loss of CP1 in this situation; and thus when the noise-
added data is traded, such a profit and a loss will change
to (1 − e1)CC1 and (1 − e1)CP1 respectively; 3) when the
malicious behavior of the data collector is perceived, he will
suffer a loss of CC2 due to the reputation loss; at the same
time, the data provider would gain a payoff of CP2 because
she makes up the future data breach loss. In light of the above
analysis, the probability of detecting privacy leakage is 1−e2.
Based on the above analysis, we can deduce the payoffs of
two players in each state. For example, when both players are
defective, namely in the state of DD, the payoff of the data
provider includes three parts: the profit obtained from selling
noise-added data to the data collector (i.e., (1 − e1)CP ), the
expected loss of privacy leakage (namely (1−e1)CP1) and the
expected profit ((1 − e2)CP2) due to detecting the malicious
behavior of the data collector which can compensate for future
privacy leakage loss. Hence, the payoff of the data provider is
(1−e1)CP − (1−e1)CP1+(1−e2)CP2 as shown in Table I.
We omit the analysis on how to calculate the payoffs of two
players in other states for avoiding redundancy.
Denote the payoff vectors of the data provider and the
collector as
UP = (UP (CC), UP (CD), UP (DC), UP (DD)),
and
UC = (UC(CC), UC(CD), UC(DC), UC(DD)),
respectively. In the following, we will analyze the relation-
ship among these payoffs. From the perspective of the data
provider, her payoff when the data collector acts C is always
higher than that when D is adopted by the data collector, im-
plying an honest data collector is good for the data provider. In
addition, the data provider can gain more profits if she chooses
C rather than D when the data collector is cooperative, which
accords with the practice that the original data is more valuable
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX IN THE DATA TRADING GAME.
X’s Action Y’s Action X’s Payoff Y’s Payoff
C
C CP CC
D CP − CP1 + (1− e2)CP2 CC + CC1 − (1− e2)CC2
D
C (1− e1)CP (1− e1)CC
D (1− e1)CP − (1− e1)CP1 + (1− e2)CP2 (1− e1)CC + (1− e1)CC1 − (1− e2)CC2
than the noisy data in a healthy data trading environment. As
a result, we can obtain
UP (CC) > UP (CD), (1)
UP (CC) > UP (DC) > UP (DD). (2)
If CP > CP1, which means that the value of data is larger
than that of the privacy, and hence the data provider will obtain
the least profit when both players choose D. Otherwise, when
CP < CP1, the data provider is more sensitive to data privacy,
which makes her payoff minimized when she acts C while the
data collector takes the action D.
We elaborate further on (1) and (2). From the viewpoint
of the data collector, we make an assumption that the data
collector can always obtain higher when he defects than when
he cooperates. This is because if the data collector cannot
benefit from leaking privacy, his dilemma would disappear
and he would decide not to resell data to third parties. In
this case, it is not of interest to study the privacy leakage
problem in data trading. Hence, the above assumption clarifies
the conditions under which our problem exists. Moreover, we
think the payoff of the data collector when the provider acts
C is more than that when she is defective. In another word,
the condition guarantees the noisy data is less valuable than
the original data. Conclusively, we have
UC(CD) > UC(CC) > UC(DC), (3)
UC(CD) > UC(DD) > UC(DC). (4)
Based on (3) and (4), the data collector can maximize
and minimize his payoff when the states are CD and DC
respectively.
IV. NOISY-SEQUENTIALLY ZERO-DETERMINANT
STRATEGIES
As mentioned above, due to being at a disadvantage, the
data provider may have to sell a privacy-preserving version
of data to the collector. Hence, to realize a win-win situation
where the data provider reports authentic data and the collector
preserves privacy, we take a fresh approach to reverse the
disadvantaged position of the data provider. To that aim, we
empower the data provider to adopt ZD strategies [11], so that
she can unilaterally set the utility of the collector to motivate
a healthy data trading environment. However, the original
ZD strategies cannot be directly employed here, because the
interaction between the data provider and the collector is a
noisy sequential game. Particularly, in our scenario, the noises
e1 and e2 are added into data by the provider and the collector
respectively, leaving it to the player to determine the action of
the opponent only through observations. Due to the errors in
observation, the calculation of the state transition probabilities
should take into considerations all possible actions taken by
the opponent, which is in stark contrast from that in the
original ZD strategies.
To tailor the ZD strategies to the data trading game,
we propose the noisy-sequentially zero-determinant (NSZD)
strategies, which are detailed as follows. In the data trading
game, the data provider takes action first, and thus her strategy
is made based on the joint actions of two players in the
previous round. Let p be the strategy of the data provider
and then we have
p = (p1, p2, p3, p4).
The elements in p are the cooperation probabilities of the data
provider under each of the previous outcome Cg,Cb,Dg and
Db, where g and b represent observation results reflecting the
data collector are cooperative and defective respectively.
Since the data collector is a follower in the sequential game,
he can make the decision according to his observation on the
actions of the data provider in the current round, which is
denoted as
q = (q1, q2).
In q, each element denotes the cooperation probabilities of the
data collector under each of his observations g and b.
With the definitions of p and q, the Markov matrix of the
data trading game can be constructed as
M = [Mvw]4×4,
where Mvw means the transition probability from state v to w.
Both v and w belong to the state space {CC,CD,DC,DD},
so M is a 4 × 4 matrix. The state transition probability can
be obtained by
Mvw = Fvw ·Gvw,
of which Fvw and Gvw respectively represent the probabilities
of actions made by the data provider and the data collector to
form state w when the state of the previous round is v. Fvw
and Gvw can be calculated as follows.
Fvw =

f(1) v = CC
e2f(1) + (1− e2)f(2) v = CD
f(3) v = DC
e2f(3) + (1− e2)f(4) v = DD
,
Fig. 2. Markov matrix of the data trading game.

p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)[(1− e1)q1 + e1q2] (1− p1)[(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2)]
[e2p1 + (1− e2)p2] q1 [e2p1 + (1− e2)p2] (1− q1)
(
[e2(1− p1) + (1− e2)(1− p2)]
[(1− e1)q1 + e1q2]
) (
[e2(1− p1) + (1− e2)(1− p2)]
[(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2)]
)
p3q1 p3(1− q1) (1− p3)[(1− e1)q1 + e1q2] (1− p3)[(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2)]
[e2p3 + (1− e2)p4] q1 [e2p3 + (1− e2)p4] (1− q1)
(
[e2(1− p3) + (1− e2)(1− p4)]
[(1− e1)q1 + e1q2]
) (
[e2(1− p3) + (1− e2)(1− p4)]
[(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2)]
)

where f(i) = piαi(1− pi)1−αi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and when the
data provider chooses to take action C, αi = 1, otherwise
αi = 0.
Gvw =

q1 w = CC
1− q1 w = CD
(1− e1)q1 + e1q2 w = DC
(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2) w = DD
.
We further explain the calculation of Fvw and Gvw. If the
opponent cooperates, the player can judge its action clearly
since no noise is added to interfere with the observation. In
another word, the action of an opponent obtained through
observation is the same as the actual one in this case. There-
fore, when v = CC,DC, implying that the data collector is
cooperative in the previous round, the data provider gets the
observation g with the probability of 1, and then Fvw = f(1)
in the case v = CC and Fvw = f(3) in the case v = DC
because in these two situations, the data provider adopts her
strategy only based on the previous outcome Cg and Dg,
respectively. Likewise, when w = CC,CD, implying that the
data provider cooperates in the current round, the data collector
observes g with no interference and takes action under the
current outcome g. Thus, Gvw = q1 in the case w = CC and
Gvw = 1− q1 in the case w = CD.
When the opponent takes action D, observation errors may
occur whose chances are proportional to the noises 1 − e1
and e2. In this case, the transition probability depends on the
probabilities of all possible observations. To explain how to
calculate the transition probability in this situation, we take
v = DD,w = DD as an example to deduce Fvw and Gvw. As
shown in Fig. 3, when the data collector defects in the previous
round, the data provider may get a false observation with a
probability of e2 and then she has the probability of (1−p3) to
take action D under the previous outcome Dg. On the contrary,
the data provider has the probability of (1− e2) to know the
data collector’s defective action and chooses to defect with
the probability of (1 − p4). Therefore, the probability of the
data provider taking action D when v = DD is [e2(1− p3)+
(1 − e2)(1 − p4)]. When the data provider takes the action
D with noise e1, the data collector considers the opponent
is cooperative and defective with the probability of (1 − e1)
and e1 respectively. Hence, the data collector would have the
probabilities of (1− q1) and (1− q2) to choose the action D
under these two circumstances. In this case, the probability that
the data collector takes action D when the data provider adopts
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the transition from previous state DD to a new state
DD. The red circle shows the real action of two players while the blue one
is the combination of action and observation or just observation.
D is [(1− e1)(1− q1) + e1(1− q2)]. Taking advantage of the
similar methods, we can calculate the transition probabilities
in other cases, and thus the state transition matrix M, also
known as the Markov matrix, can be deduced as shown in
Fig. 2.
Let v be the stationary vector of M such that
vTM = vTor vTM′ = 0, (5)
where M′ =M−I and 0 is a vector with each element being
0. According to Cramer’s rules, the following equation holds
Adj(M′)M′ = det(M′)I = 0, (6)
in which Adj(M′) is the adjugate matrix of M
′
. In light
of (5) and (6), we know that the stationary vector v is
proportional to every row of Adj(M′) [11]. Consequently,
v can equal to the fourth row of Adj(M′), each element
of which is calculated from the first three columns of M′.
The determinant of M′ remains unchanged if we take the
following two elementary transformations: i) adding the first
column of M′ into the second one and ii) adding the second
column with multiplier factor [(1 − e1)q1 + e1q2] into the
third one. Finally, replacing the last column of M′ by an
arbitrary four-element vector f = [f1, f2, f3, f4], we can get
a new matrix
M =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
... p1 − 1 0 f1
... e2p1 + (1− e2)p2 − 1 0 f2
... p3 (1− e1)q1 + e1q2 − 1 f3
... e2p3 + (1− e2)p4 (1− e1)q1 + e1q2 f4
pˆ qˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
with the second column (denoted as pˆ) being solely
controlled by the data provider and the third column (denoted
as qˆ) being only related to the strategies of the data collector.
Moreover, we omit the first column because what we focus
on is the relation between the second (or third) column and
the fourth column. The dot product of the stationary vector v
and f can be written as
v · f = D(pˆ, qˆ, f),
because the determinant D(pˆ, qˆ, f) can be expanded by the
minors on the fourth column of M, and each coefficient of
fc (c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) is just the components of v described
above. We have known that the stationary vector of a Markov
matrix is the probability vector in the long run. Therefore, if
f = UP, the payoff vector of the data provider, the determi-
nant D(pˆ, qˆ,UP ) is the expected payoff of the data provider.
Follow the same way, we can obtain the data collector’s
expected payoff when we replace f by UC.
Based on [11], the normalized expected payoff of the data
provider (SP ) and the data collector (SC) can be respectively
derived as:
SP =
v ·UP
v · 1 =
D(pˆ, qˆ,UP)
D(pˆ, qˆ,1)
,
SC =
v ·UC
v · 1 =
D(pˆ, qˆ,UC)
D(pˆ, qˆ,1)
.
Thus, the liner relation of the two expected payoffs with
coefficients α ∈ R, β ∈ R, γ ∈ R can be written as:
αSP + βSC + γ =
D(pˆ, qˆ, αUP + βUC + γ1)
D(pˆ, qˆ,1)
. (7)
If the data provider chooses a proper strategy satisfying
pˆ = αUP + βUC + γ1, (8)
or the data collector’s strategy can meet
qˆ = αUP + βUC + γ1, (9)
αSP + βSC + γ = 0, indicating that the linear relation
between the two expected payoffs (SP and SC) is established.
Since the strategies referred above are realized by setting the
determinant to zero and they function in a noisy sequential
game, we call them the noisy-sequentially zero-determinant
(NSZD) strategies. In the following, we will detail how to use
the NSZD strategies for the data provider to set the expected
utility of the data collector to create a win-win situation where
the data trading market is healthy.
V. THE DATA PROVIDER AS A PINNING NSZD PLAYER
In this study, we will analyze how the data provider takes
advantage of the NSZD strategies to dominate the game with
the data collector. In detail, the data provider can adopt the
pinning and extortionate NSZD strategies. By the former
strategy, the data provider can unilaterally control the payoff of
the opponent in the noisy sequential game no matter how the
collector will react, while through the latter strategy, the data
provider can enforce an extortionate linear relation between
her and the collector’s expected payoff, thereby always seizing
an advantageous share of payoffs. In the following, the pinning
NSZD strategy is detailed.
Theorem V.1. The data provider can unilaterally set the
expected payoff of the opponent (i.e., the data collector) as
SC = −γ
β
=
A(1− p1) +Bp4
(1− p1 + p4) , (10)
where A = UC(DD)−e2UC(DC)1−e2 and B = UC(CC).
Proof. In light of (8), if the data provider can find proper
p1, p2, p3 and p4 to let pˆ = βUC+ γ1 (set α = 0) hold, then
she can unilaterally set the opponent’s expected payoff as
SC = −γ
β
. (11)
Particularly, pˆ = βUC + γ1 equals to that the following
equation set holds,
p1 − 1 = βUC(CC) + γ
e2p1 + (1− e2)p2 − 1 = βUC(CD) + γ
p3 = βUC(DC) + γ
e2p3 + (1− e2)p4 = βUC(DD) + γ
. (12)
There are six variables (p1, p2, p3, p4, β and γ) in the above
equation set. We use p1 and p4 to represent the rest variables.
Then p2 and p3 can be written as
p2 =
1
D1
{[UC(CD)− UC(DD) + e2(UC(DC)
− UC(CC))]p1 + [UC(CC)− UC(CD)](1 + p4)},
(13)
p3 =
1
D1
{[UC(DD)− UC(DC)](1− p1) + [UC(CC)
− UC(DC)](1− e2)p4},
(14)
where D1 = UC(CC)−UC(DD)−e2[UC(CC)−UC(DC)].
Then, according to (12), (13), and (14), the expected payoff
of the data collector can be represented as (10).
Theorem V.2. When p4 6= 0, p1 6= 1, the expected payoff of
the data collector SC increases as p1 or p4 increases.
Proof. In light of (10), we found i) when p4 = 0, SC = A;
ii) when p1 = 1, SC = B; and iii) when A = B, SC =
A = B. For further analyzing the impact of the data provider’s
strategy on the expected payoff of the collector, we deduce the
following partial differential equations for p1 and p4. These
are,
∂SC
∂p1
=
(B −A)p4
(1− p1 + p4)2
∂SC
∂p4
=
(B −A)(1− p1)
(1− p1 + p4)2
. (15)
According to (3) and (4), A < B should hold in the
data trading game since the more possible the data provider
will cooperate, the larger the data collector’s expected payoff.
Therefore, when p4 6= 0, p1 6= 1, SC increases as p1 or p4
increases in light of (15).
Next, we will discuss the impacts of the noises e1 and e2,
two key parameters in the data trading game. e1 and e2 are
closely related to the strategies of the data provider and the
collector since they directly influence the payoff vectors of
both players and the transfer probabilities (the Markov matrix).
Through our analysis, we have the following theorem:
Theorem V.3. The noises e1 and e2 respectively added by the
data provider and the collector, have the opposite impacts on
the expected payoff of the data collector SC . In detail, SC
decreases monotonously with e1 and increases monotonously
with e2.
The above theorem can be easily obtained by using SC to
derive partial derivatives for e1 and e2. That is,
∂SC
∂e1
= − 1− p1
1− p1 + p4
(1− e2)CC + τ1CC1
1− e2 < 0, (16)
∂SC
∂e2
=
1− p1
1− p1 + p4
(1− e1)τ1CC1
(1− e2)2 > 0. (17)
According to Theorem V.3, the larger the noise e1, the smaller
the expected payoff of the data collector SC , while a small
noise e2 will lower the expected payoff of the data collector.
These accord with the reality that the larger noise added by the
data provider will reduce the value of her data, which leads
to a lower payoff of the data collector, and when the data
collector reduces his noise, his malicious behavior is easier to
be detected, damaging his reputation and hence causing a less
expected payoff of his own.
Finally, we employ the numerical analysis2 to study the
impact of the data provider’s strategy on SC , the expected
payoff of the data collector. Figs. 4 and 5 respectively show
how SC changes with the strategy of the data provider under
different noise and profit settings. Both Figs. 4 and 5 verify
our above analysis that the increasing of p1 and p4 leads to
that of SC ; moreover, the data collector gets a lower payoff
when e1 increases or e2 decreases, and vice versa. In addition,
the red part in each subfigure indicates the feasible region
under which the data provider can control the data collector’s
expected payoff, demonstrating that the data provider can be
a pinning NSZD player with proper strategies.
Being a pinning NSZD player, the data provider can uni-
laterally set the data collector’s expected payoff. When the
data collector’s strategy is driven by maximizing his expected
payoff, he will prefer to the strategy that can increase his ex-
pected payoff. Hence, taking advantage of the pinning NSZD
strategy, the data provider can increase the data collector’s
expected payoff when he chose to cooperate and decrease
his expected payoff when he defected in the previous round
to incentivize the cooperation of the data collector. Such an
incentive mechanism with the reward-punishment method is
intuitive and has been well discussed in [18]. In [18], we
formulated the interaction between the requestor and any
2It is worth noting that in all numerical simulations of our paper, we test
multiple parameter settings, but we only show a part of them since other
results present similar trends. So we omit them for avoiding redundancy.
worker in a crowdsourcing scenario as a prisoner’s dilemma
game and then employed the ZD strategy to promote the
cooperation of any malicious worker. Although the scenario
of [18] is different from ours in which the data trading is
modeled as a noisy sequential game, once the data provider can
be a pinning NSZD player, the pinning NSZD-based incentive
mechanism is similar to that in [18]. Therefore, we omit the
incentive scheme to avoid redundancy. Instead, we mainly
focus on under which conditions the data provider can adopt
the pinning NSZD strategy to set the data collector’s expected
payoff, as we analyzed above.
VI. THE DATA PROVIDER AS AN EXTORTIONATE NSZD
PLAYER
The above pinning NSZD strategy focuses on unilaterally
setting the expected payoff of the opponent while the extor-
tionate one aims at establishing an extortionate linear relation
between the extortionate NSZD player and its opponent’s
expected payoffs. In light of [11], (8) can be rewritten as the
following form
pˆ = φ[(UP − l11)− χ(UC − l21)], (18)
where φ, χ > 1 and l1 > 0, l2 > 0 are the parameters. Under
such a strategy, an extortionate share of expected payoffs larger
than l1 and l2 respectively can be obtained. That is,
SP − l1
SC − l2 = χ. (19)
According to (19), the larger χ is, the more extortionate
share of the expected payoffs the data provider can get. Hence,
χ is called the extortion factor.
Theorem VI.1. When φ > 0,
UP (DD)− l1
UC(DD)− l2 ≥
UP (CC)− l1
UC(CC)− l2 ,
UP (DD)− l1
UC(DD)− l2 > 1,
(20)
should be satisfied and otherwise,
UP (CD)− l1
UC(CD)− l2 ≥
UP (DC)− l1
UC(DC)− l2 ,
UP (CD)− l1
UC(CD)− l2 > 1
(21)
needs to hold, so that the data provider can adopt the strategy
pˆ = φ[(UP − l11)−χ(UC − l21)] to enforce the extortionate
share of the expected payoffs.
Proof. The strategy to realize the extortionate relationship,
namely (18), can be further expanded as
p1 =φ[UP (CC)− l1 − χ(UC(CC)− l2)] + 1
e2p1 + (1− e2)p2 =φ[UP (CD)− l1 − χ(UC(CD)− l2)] + 1
p3 = φ[UP (DC)− l1 − χ(UC(DC)− l2)]
e2p3 + (1− e2)p4 = φ[UP (DD)− l1 − χ(UC(DD)− l2)]
.
(a) e1 = 0.3, e2 = 0.5 (b) e1 = 0.5, e2 = 0.5 (c) e1 = 0.5, e2 = 0.3
Fig. 4. Impact of the data provider’s strategy on the expected payoff of the data collector with CP = CC = 5, CP1 = CC1 = 2, CP2 = CC2 = 3.
(a) e1 = 0.3, e2 = 0.5 (b) e1 = 0.5, e2 = 0.5 (c) e1 = 0.5, e2 = 0.3
Fig. 5. Impact of the data provider’s strategy on the expected payoff of the data collector with CP = CC = 10, CP1 = CC1 = 2, CP2 = CC2 = 5.
Since p1, p2, p3, p4, e1 and e2 should be within [0, 1], we can
get the following inequalities:
0 ≤ φ[UP (CC)− l1 − χ(UC(CC)− l2)] + 1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ φ[UP (CD)− l1 − χ(UC(CD)− l2)] + 1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ φ[UP (DC)− l1 − χ(UC(DC)− l2)] ≤ 1
0 ≤ φ[UP (DD)− l1 − χ(UC(DD)− l2)] ≤ 1
. (22)
According to (22), when φ > 0, the following inequality
should hold
UP (CC)− l1
UC(CC)− l2 ≤ χ ≤
UP (DD)− l1
UC(DD)− l2 . (23)
Only when χ > 1, can the data provider obtain an extortionate
share of expected payoffs. Hence, combining (23) with χ > 1,
we have (20). Similarly, according to (22), when φ < 0, the
following conditions need to satisfy
UP (DC)− l1
UC(DC)− l2 ≤ χ ≤
UP (CD)− l1
UC(CD)− l2 . (24)
Combing the above condition with χ > 1, we have (21). In
summary, when φ > 0, (20) should be satisfied and otherwise,
(21) needs to hold, so that χ > 1 and (22) holds, making the
data provider can adopt the strategy pˆ = φ[(UP − l11) −
χ(UC−l21)] to enforce the extortionate share of the expected
payoffs.
Finally, we employ the numerical analysis to study the
impact of the noises e1 and e2 on χ when φ > 0, which
further influences whether we can find a feasible pˆ. The 3D
graphes in Fig. 6 illustrate how χ changes with e1 and e2 when
CP = CC = 5, CP1 = CC1 = 2, and CP2 = CC2 = 3, under
different settings of l1 and l2. Under each of 3D graphes, we
use a 2D graph to show the impact of the noises on the feasible
χ, where all the feasible values of χ are projected on the e1−e2
plane as indicated in the red part of the graph. In light of (22),
the feasible χ can lead to the feasible pˆ, empowering the data
provider to execute an extortionate NSZD strategy.
When the data provider adopts an extortionate NSZD strat-
egy, due to χ > 1, the expected payoff of the data collector is
positive related to that of the data provider according to (19).
In another word, if the data collector wants to maximize his
expected payoff, he has to maximize that of the data provider.
In light of (1) and (2), when both players are cooperative,
implying that the state is CC, the payoff of the data provider
is the maximum. Hence, as a rational player who is payoff-
driven, it is better for the data collector to choose cooperation.
Undoubtedly, when the data collector cooperates, the best
action taken by the data provider is also C to pursue the
maximum payoff according to (1) and (2). As a result, taking
advantage of the extortionate NSZD strategy, the data provider
can dominate the game to determine the positive relationship
between her expected payoff and that of the data collector,
compelling the cooperation of the data collector and thus
realizing a healthy data trading market where the data provider
reports pure data while the collector does not resell data to
third parties.
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(c) l1 = 2, l2 = 1
Fig. 6. Impact of the noise e1 and e2 on the extortion factor χ with CP = CC = 5, CP1 = CC1 = 2, CP2 = CC2 = 3.
VII. THE DATA COLLECTOR AS AN NSZD PLAYER
Using the NSZD strategies, the data provider can reverse her
disadvantage to dominate the game with the data collector,
through which some incentive mechanisms can be applied
to purify the data trading market. Such an idea also raises
a concern: what if the data collector, who has already been
in a dominant position, adopts the powerful tool, namely the
NSZD strategies? To answer this question, in this section, we
will analyze whether the data collector has the chance to be
an NSZD player. That’s to say, whether the data collector’s
strategy can make qˆ = αUP + βUC + γ1 hold? Through
analysis, we have the following theorems.
Theorem VII.1. The data collector cannot adopt the pinning
NSZD strategy in the data trading game.
Proof. If the data collector wants to set the opponent’s ex-
pected payoff by a pinning strategy, qˆ = αUP +γ (set β = 0)
should hold, which can be expanded as

0 = αUP (CC) + γ
0 = αUP (CD) + γ
(1− e1)q1 + e1q1 − 1 = αUP (DC) + γ
(1− e1)q1 + e1q1 = αUP (DD) + γ
.
It’s obvious that the first two equations of the equation set
cannot be satisfied at the same time unless UP (CC) =
UP (CD), which deviates from (1). Hence, this theorem can
be proved.
Theorem VII.2. The data collector cannot adopt the extor-
tionate NSZD strategy in the data trading game.
Proof. Similarly, the following equations should be satisfied
if the data collector wants to adopt an extortionate strategy.
0 =φ[UP (CC)− l1 − χ(UC(CC)− l2)] + 1
0 =φ[UP (CD)− l1 − χ(UC(CD)− l2)] + 1
(1− e1)q1 + e1q1 − 1 = φ[UP (DC)− l1 − χ(UC(DC)− l2)]
(1− e1)q1 + e1q1 = φ[UP (DD)− l1 − χ(UC(DD)− l2)]
.
To make the first two equations hold at the same time,
UP (CC)−l1
UC(CC)−l2 =
UP (CD)−l1
UC(CD)−l2 must be satisfied. However, accord-
ing to (1) and (3), UP (CC) > UP (CD) and UC(CC) <
UC(CD), implying that
UP (CC)−l1
UC(CC)−l2 >
UP (CD)−l1
UC(CD)−l2 . Hence, we
cannot find proper φ and χ to satisfy the first two equations
above. Therefore, the data collector cannot be an extortioner
in the data trading game.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the privacy leakage issue in data
trading, by taking a fresh view to make the data provider
dominate the game with the collector. To that aim, we set a
noisy sequential game model to depict the interaction between
the data provider and its collector where both sides are allowed
to take preventive measures against each other. Based on this
model, we propose NSZD strategies, which empower the data
provider to i) unilaterally set the expected payoff of the data
collector through the pinning strategy; and ii) enforce a posi-
tive relationship between her and the data collector’s expected
payoffs by the extortionate strategy. Both strategies make room
for incentive mechanisms to stimulate the cooperation of the
data collector. Through the numerical simulations, we examine
the impact of key parameters and the feasible region under
which the data provider can be an NSZD player. Finally, we
prove that the data collector cannot be an NSZD player to
take advantage of the pinning or extortionate strategies for
deteriorating privacy leakage in the data trading market.
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